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 Fetishizing Copies 
 Jessica  Litman * 
 Abstract 
 Our copyright laws encourage authors to create new works and communicate them to 
the public, because we hope that people will read the books, listen to the music, see 
the art, watch the fi lms, run the software, and build and inhabit the buildings. That 
is the way that copyright promotes the Progress of Science. Recently, that not-very-
controversial principle has collided with copyright owners’ conviction that they should 
be able to control, or at least collect royalties from, all uses of their works. A particularly 
ill-considered manifestation of this conviction is what I have decided to call copy-
fetish. This is the idea that every appearance of any part of a work anywhere should 
be deemed a “copy” of it, and that every single copy needs a license or excuse. In this 
chapter, I focus on two well-known instances of copy-fetish: the contention that any 
appearance of a work or part of a work in the random access memory of a computer or 
other digital device is an actionable copy, and the assertion that the mere possession of 
a publicly accessible copy infringes the exclusive right to distribute copies to the public. 
Both arguments have their inception in diffi cult-to-justify court of appeals decisions, 
which were then embraced by copyright owners as tools to expand secondary liability. 
Neither one makes much sense on its own terms. The political economy of copyright, 
however, makes it overwhelmingly likely that any comprehensive copyright revision 
bill will incorporate both of them. That makes it imperative that we recognize readers’, 
listeners’, and viewers’ copyright liberties expressly, and protect them with explicit 
statutory provisions. 
 ! ! ! 
 *  John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of Michigan. I’m grateful 
to Jon Weinberg, Pam Samuelson, Terry Fisher, Niva Elkin-Koren, Peter Jaszi, Justin Hughes, Ruth 
Okediji, and Jane Ginsburg, who read drafts of this chapter and made extremely useful suggestions for 
improving it. 
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 The most important reason that we have copyright laws is to encourage authors to 
create books, music, art, theatre, fi lms, computer software, and building designs, 
and to communicate those works to the public. 1 The most important reason we want 
to authors to create and communicate new works is that we hope that people will 
read the books, listen to the music, see the art, watch the fi lms, run the software, 
and build and inhabit the buildings. That is the way that copyright promotes the 
Progress of Science. 2 
 This assertion has become more contentious than it used to be. If the most 
important reason for copyright is to encourage readers, listeners, and viewers to 
experience works of authorship, that suggests that readers, listeners, and viewers 
have signifi cant interests that the copyright laws should pay attention to. And 
that’s controversial, even though it shouldn’t be, because too many advocates 
for copyright owners have concluded that any explicit attention to the copyright 
interests of readers, listeners, and viewers might undermine the interests of 
owners. 3 Thus, over the past decade, we’ve seen ill-considered overstatements in 
copyright speeches and essays to the effect that there are no readers’ rights under 
copyright law. 4 
 The notion of readers’ interests in copyright law wasn’t invented by some 21st 
century cyber-radicals. The concept that the public (which is to say, readers, listeners, 
and viewers) have copyright interests that are as important and sometimes more 
important than the interests of authors and owners has a long scholarly pedigree; 5 
 1  Copyright laws may also accomplish other goals. Over the past few years, I have heard people mention 
such purposes as securing a favorable balance of trade, providing jobs, and exporting American values. 
See U.S. Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and 
Innovation in the Internet Economy,  www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf 
(2013); Stewart Siwerk, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2013 Report (2013),  www.iipa 
 .com/pdf/2013_Copyright_Industries_Full_Report.PDF (prepared for the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance); Chris Dodd, Copyright:  A  Leading Force for Jobs, Innovation and Growth, 
Huffi ngton Post,  www.huffi ngtonpost.com/chris-dodd/copyright–a-leading-forc_b_4302882.html 
(Nov. 19, 2013). Those subsidiary purposes, though, are common to many different businesses, and are 
by-products of a functioning copyright system, rather than its core goals. 
 2  Accord Jane C.  Ginsburg ,  Authors and Users in Copyright ,  45  J. Copyright Soc’y  1 ,  4 – 5 ( 1997 ) 
(“authors . . . enrich society by creating works which promote learning”). 
 3  See  Henry  Horbaczewski ,  Copyright Under Siege: Refl ection of an In-House Counsel, The Sixth Annual 
Christopher A Meyer Memorial Lecture ,  53  J. Copr. Soc’y  387 ,  393–94 ( 2006 ) ;  I. Fred  Koenigsberg , 
 The Fifth Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture: Humpty-Dumpty in Copyrightland ,  51 
 J. Copr. Soc’y  677 ,  679 ( 2004 ) . See also Ginsburg,  supra  note 2 , at 20 (“Copyright is a law about 
creativity; it is not, and should not become, merely a law for the facilitation of consumption.”). 
 4  See, e.g.,  David  Johnstone ,  Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law ,  52 
 J. Copyright Soc’y  345 ( 2005 ) ; Koenigsberg,  supra  note 3 , at 679. 
 5  See, e.g., R obert Gorman, Copyright Law 1 (1991); Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View 
of Copyright (1967); L.  Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968); 
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it appears in many of the Supreme Court copyright decisions handed down in the 
20th Century, 6 and is expressed in the legislative history of every major copyright 
statute. 7 So why has it suddenly morphed into a dangerous idea? 
 Some of it, I  think, is real fear caused by the rapid development of networked 
digital technology. The markets for works of authorship have evolved more swiftly 
than our 40-year-old statute can adjust to. A  reader, viewer, or listener equipped 
with networked digital technology can look like a scary machine for disseminating 
millions of copies. 8 Another reason may be the sense that compensation for creators 
is already shockingly inadequate. Any suggestion that readers might be entitled to 
rights seems to threaten to shave off another portion of what has turned out to be a 
tiny share of the sloshing piles of money that inhabit the copyright system. Some of 
it is surely conviction, not grounded in either law or history, that copyright owners 
should be able to control, or at least collect royalties from,  all uses of their works. 
That’s never been true, either in fact or law, but representatives of copyright owners 
have gotten used to arguing that it should be true. 9 
 A particularly ill-considered manifestation of this conviction is what I  have 
decided to call copy-fetish. This is the idea that every appearance of any part of a 
work anywhere should be deemed a “copy” of it, and that every single copy needs a 
license or excuse, whether or not anyone will ever see the copy, whether or not the 
copy has any independent economic signifi cance, whether or not the so-called copy 
is incidental to some other use that is completely lawful. 
 Copy-fetish inspired the Authors Guild to sue the HathiTrust for copyright 
infringement over copies that HathiTrust archived and indexed but didn’t allow 
Thomas Edward Scrutton, The Laws of Copyright (1883); Zechariah Chafee,  Refl ections on 
the Law of Copyright , 45  Colum. L. Rev . 503 (1945) . 
 6  See Quality King v. L’Anza, 523 U.S. 135, 150 (1998); Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 526–27(1994); 
Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991); Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 429(1984); Twentieth 
Century Music v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also 
U.S. v. Loew’s, 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962); U.S. v. Paramount, 334 U.S. 131, 148 (1948); Fox Film v. Doyal, 
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) . 
 7  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 190, 105th Cong. 9 (1998); H.R. Rep. 2222, 60th Cong. 7 (1909). 
 8  See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 2003: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 107th 
Cong. 455–63 (2002) (testimony of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Assn of Am); David Price, Sizing the 
Piracy Universe (2013), at  www.netnames.com//sites/default/fi les/netnames-sizing_piracy_universe- 
 FULLreport-sept2013.pdf (NetNames report commissioned by NBC Universal). 
 9  See, e.g., Fair Copyright in Research Works Act: Hearing on HR 6845 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong., 
50–51 (2009) (Serial # 110-204) (testimony of Ralph Oman, former Register of Copyrights); Performance 
Rights Act: Hearing on HR 848 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 29 (2009) (testimony 
of Billy Corgan, MusicFIRST) (Serial # 111-8); Mark Helprin,  A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t its 
Copyright? , N.Y.  Times , May 20, 2007, at  www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/opinion/20helprin.html . 
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anyone to see. 10 Copy-fetish has persuaded others that fair use has somehow run amok 
because copyright owners are losing lawsuits that they would probably never have 
brought if they didn’t feel obliged to protect themselves from all unlicensed copies. 11 
Copy-fetish is encouraging lobbyists to push the United States Trade Representative 
to negotiate bilateral free trade agreements that incorporate copyright provisions 
far more generous to copyright owners (and stingier to copy users) than anything 
in U.S.  law. 12 Copy-fetish is impelling copyright’s defenders to insist that readers, 
listeners, and viewers have and should have no rights under the copyright law, at 
least if attention to user rights might breed tolerance for unlicensed copies. 13 As a 
rhetorical strategy, that tack seems short-sighted. Without a wide swath of freedom 
for readers, listeners, and viewers to encounter and enjoy works of authorship, the 
copyright law accomplishes little and is hard to defend. 
 Every single one of us who writes books, or articles, or stories, or music, or makes 
art, or photographs, or major motion pictures does so, at least in part, as an act 
of communication. We want to convey our ideas, words, sounds, and images to 
audiences, so that they can enjoy them, appreciate them, interact with them, and 
learn from them. The copyright system works because, in addition to encouraging 
authors to create works and communicate them to the public, it encourages 
audiences to read, listen, look at, learn from, and interact with those works. 
 10  See  Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust , 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’g 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (SDNY 
2013). When the district court upheld HathiTrust’s fair use defense, one rightsholder representative 
reportedly described the decision as the 21st century’s  Plessy v. Ferguson . See  http://policynotes.arl 
 .org/post/79876737815/recap-of-the-copyright-offi ces-roundtables-on-orphan ; Preservation and Reuse 
of Copyrighted Works: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-88) (testimony of James 
Neal, Columbia University). That’s silly. There are lots of copies in the HathiTrust archive, but 
nobody actually sees them; nobody can read them. The copies make it possible to index, to perform 
sophisticated digital analysis of the text, and to attach metadata that tells us who owns the copyright 
and when the work will enter the public domain. None of that has ever been an infringement of 
copyright. See, e.g.,  New York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface , 434 F. Supp. 217 (SDNY 1977). The 
digital copies allow remote readers to search the text and discover that a particular word is in the book, 
but not to see so much as a snippet of the text itself. They make it possible to generate readable copies 
for print-disabled readers, which is explicitly permitted under 17 USC § 121. No licensing market has 
arisen for these uses and it is diffi cult to imagine how such a market could be designed. For most of 
the works in the HathiTrust collection, there is no easy way to ascertain the identity of the people or 
businesses that would be entitled to give permission for these uses if permission were required. The 
primary objection to what HathiTrust is doing is the largely noneconomic objection that the archive 
has a bunch of digital copies that nobody sees or reads, and that it didn’t get licenses for those copies. 
 11  See, e.g.,  White v. West Publishing , 12-CV-01340 (SDNY Feb. 11, 2013);  American Institute of Physics 
 v. Winstead , 109 USPQ 2d 1661 (ND Tx 2013);  Shell v. City of Radford , Virginia, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510 
(WD Va 2005). 
 12  See, e.g.,  Margot  Kaminski ,  The  Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. 
Trade Regime ,  87  S. Cal. L. Rev .  977 ( 2014 ) . 
 13  See, e.g.,  Darren Hudson  Hick ,  Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems of Fair Use and Users’ 
Rights ,  56  J. Copyr. Soc’y U.S.A.  485 ( 2008 ) . 
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 The opportunities for readers, listeners, and viewers to read, hear, see, learn 
from, enjoy, and use works of authorship have always been among copyright law’s 
most crucial features. For U.S.  copyright law’s fi rst two centuries, it was rarely 
important to worry explicitly about the copyright rights of readers, listeners, and 
viewers, because the law left reading, listening, and viewing alone. Copyright law 
might have burdened the enjoyment of copyrighted works by supporting a system 
in which copies were scarce, overpriced, or both, but it didn’t impinge directly on 
reading, seeing, or hearing those works. Publishers or bookstores that distributed 
books that were plagiarized from other works might have faced liability under the 
copyright law, 14 but it was never unlawful to read the books. George Harrison’s 
 My Sweet Lord might have infringed Ronald Mack’s  He’s So Fine , 15 but Harrison 
fans who heard the song over the radio or played it on their phonographs were 
not themselves doing anything illegal. 16 Indeed, if, upon learning that Harrison had 
lost a copyright infringement suit, fans had run out and bought recordings of  My 
Sweet Lord on CDs, they would not have had to worry about copyright liability 
for their purchases. The owners of the Skyline Supperclub may have been willful 
infringers when the club’s band played  Proud Mary and  I Heard it Through the 
Grapevine without a performance license, 17 but the customers who danced to the 
music were not. Museum patrons who saw an infringing photograph hanging on 
the wall of the museum and bought postcards of it in the museum shop did not 
face even theoretical liability for copyright infringement unless and until they chose 
to send the postcard through the mail. Even though McDonald’s McDonaldland 
commercials infringed Sid and Mary Krofft’s  H.R. PuffNStuff programs, 18 children 
who watched the McDonaldland commercials on television were not liable for 
seeing them, nor for begging their parents to dine at McDonald’s because they were 
fans of Mayor McCheese. 
 Copyright law has traditionally sheltered readers, listeners, and viewers from 
liability for enjoying infringing works. That shelter is not an inadvertent failure to 
extend the law’s reach to its logical targets, but a crucial mechanism for encouraging 
the use and enjoyment of works of authorship, and thereby promoting the progress 
of science. Rather than giving owners a broad general right to control all uses of 
their works, the copyright law has always conferred bounded exclusive rights that 
 14  See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Horgan v. Macmillan, 789 F.2d 157 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
 15  See Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (SDNY 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub. nom. ABKCO Music v. Harrisongs Music, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 16  But see Worlds of Wonder Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, 1 USPQ 2d 1982 (ND Ohio 1986) (children 
who played unlicensed tapes in their Teddy Ruxpin toys created unauthorized derivative works; 
therefore the makers of the tapes were willful contributory infringers). 
 17  See Broadcast Music v. Davis, 1986 U.S. Dist Lexis 27005 (D.S.C. 1986). 
 18  See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonalds Corp, 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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preserve sizeable zones of liberty for members of the public. 19 Copyright owners 
are not entitled to control many valuable uses of their works, including private 
distributions, performances, or displays. The challenges of adapting copyright law 
to the networked digital environment and copyright owners’ effort to extend their 
exclusive rights to encompass control of any and all copies of their works are putting 
those zones of liberty at risk. 
 In the 21st century, we’ve seen signifi cant erosion in reader liberties. Some of the 
erosion has been technological. Networked digital technology gives copyright owners 
and their agents abilities to monitor and meter what we read, hear, and see. This turns 
out to be useful if one seeks to sell our eyes and ears to advertisers. 20 Vendors of books, 
music, and movies use this information to recommend other items we might want to 
buy. 21 Publishers of digital textbooks convey detailed information about students’ reading 
of assigned texts to their instructors to enable them to “assess student engagement” 
and intervene with individual students who may not have read the assignment with 
suffi cient attention. 22 Because it can be both handy and profi table, businesses have 
equipped digital platforms for enjoying copyrighted works with technology that can 
identify, report, and disable users and their uses. 23 
 Some of the erosion, though, has been legal. Vendors of works of authorship have 
moved from selling copies of works to a licensing model in which they detail which uses 
are permitted and which are prohibited. 24 They have yielded to the temptation to load 
the purported licenses up with multiple niggling conditions, exclusions, and bans. 25 
 19  See generally  Jessica  Litman ,  Lawful Personal Use ,  85  Tex. L. Rev .  1871 ( 2007 ) . 
 20  See, e.g., J. Howard Beales & Jeffrey A. Eisenach, An Empirical Analysis of the Value of Information 
Sharing in the Market for Online Content, Study conducted by Navigant Economics on behalf of 
the Digital Advertising Alliance, January 2014, at  www.aboutads.info/resource/fullvalueinfostudy.pdf ; 
Maxymiser, Deliver One-To-One Personalization with Quantifi able Results,  www.maxymiser.com/
products/online-personalization (visited August 4, 2014). 
 21  See, e.g., Amazon.com, About Recommendations,  www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/
ref=hp_left_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeId=16465251 (visited August 4, 2014); Apple, Inc., iTunes: Genius, 
 www.apple.com/itunes/features/ (visited Aug. 4, 2014); Netfl ix, Netfl ix Taste preferences and 
recommendations,  https://help.netfl ix.com/en/node/9898?catId=en%2F131 (visited August 4, 2014). 
 22  See  www.coursesmart.com/ . 
 23  See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Who’s Tracking Your Reading Habits? An e_Book Buyer’s 
Guide to Privacy, Nov. 29, 2012, at  www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/e-reader-privacy-chart-2012-update ; 
Canoe, About Canoe Ventures,  www.canoe-ventures.com/about.html (visited Aug. 6, 2014); Chris 
Kanaracus, Oracle Builds on Blue Kai Acquisition with Data Cloud, PC World (July 22, 2014), at 
 www.pcworld.com/article/2457000/oracle-builds-on-bluekai-acquisition-with-data-cloud.html ;Leap 
Media, About Leap Media Investments,  www.leapmediainvestments.com/about.php (visited Aug. 
6, 2014). 
 24  See generally  Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate (2012);  Aaron  Perzanowski &  Jason  Schultz , 
 Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property ,  90  Notre Dame L. Rev .  1211 ( 2015 ) . 
 25  See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Even Amazon Can’t Keep Its EULA Story Straight, BoingBoing, January 12, 
2010, at  http://boingboing.net/2010/01/12/even-amazon-cant-kee.html ; 
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Publishers of some works of authorship have combined their copyright rights, license 
terms, and legal prohibitions on circumvention of technological protections into fl orid 
schemes of user control that interfere with reader, listener, and viewer enjoyment of the 
works they purchase. 26 
 When the legal erosion in reader, listener, and viewer copyright liberties 
meets up with copyright owners’ appetite for enhanced control over all uses of 
their works, the combination creates a genuine danger that our copyright system 
will discourage rather than encourage reading, listening, and viewing. Indeed, 
the notion that readers, listeners, viewers, and other members of the public have 
cognizable interests in the copyright system strikes many copyright lawyers as both 
radical and unreasonable. The public’s interest, they insist, is entirely congruent 
with the interests of copyright owners in a strong copyright system with powerful 
enforcement mechanisms. 27 Their insistence is accompanied by bitter complaints 
painting members of the public as hordes of ravening freewatchers, 28 but they don’t 
appear to notice the irony. 
 The archetypal copy-fetish, familiar to all copyright scholars, is copyright owners’ 
inconstant devotion to the infringing Random Access Memory copy. 29 (I call the 
devotion inconstant because even the most enthusiastic backers of the notion that 
unlicensed RAM copies infringe copyrights ignore the possibility of RAM fi xation 
when it suits them. 30 ) It’s diffi cult to argue with a straight face that Congress intended 
 26  See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz,  supra  note 24 , at 1235-38; Nick Valery,  Difference Engine, 
Wanted: A Tinkerer’s Charter, Babbage Science and Technology , The Economist, Aug. 4, 2014, at  www 
 .economist.com/blogs/babbage/2014/08/difference-engine . 
 27  See, e.g.,  Mark Helprin, Digital Barbarism: A Writer’s Manifesto 131–35 (2009); Terry Hart, 
Copyright is for the Author First and the Nation Second, Copyhype, Oct. 23, 2012, at  www.copyhype 
 .com/2012/10/copyright-is-for-the-author-fi rst-and-the-nation-second/ ; Terry Hart, Copyright, the 
Public Interest, and Free Trade, Copyright Alliance Blog, March 25, 2014, at  https://copyrightalliance 
 .org/2014/03/copyright_public_interest_and_free_trade ; Koenigsberg,  supra  note 3 , at 681–89. 
 28  See, e.g., Helprin,  supra  note 27 , at 37–39; Terry Hart,  Expendables 3 and the Negative Effects of 
Piracy , Copyhype, July 30, 2014, at  www.copyhype.com/2014/07/expendables-3-and-the-negative- 
 effects-of-piracy/ ; Koenigsberg,  supra  note 3 , at 680; Tim League & Ruth Vitale, Guest Post: Here’s 
How Piracy Hurts Indie Film, IndieWire, July 11, 2014, at  www.indiewire.com/article/guest-post- 
 heres-how-piracy-hurts-indie-fi lm-20140711 ; Ruth Vitale,  We’re All Waiting Bittorrent , Creative Future 
Blog, July 31, 2014, at  http://creativefuture.org/were-waiting-bittorrent/ . See also Chris Ruen,  Fifteen 
years of utter bollocks:  how a generation’s freeloading has starved creativity , New Statesman, July 
16, 2014, at  www.newstatesman.com/culture/2014/07/fi fteen-years-utter-bollocks-how-generation-s- 
 freeloading-has-starved-creativity 
 29  See  Jane C.  Ginsburg ,  Copyright 1992–2012:  The Most Signifi cant Development? ,  23  Fordham 
Intellecutal Property Media and. Entertainment L. J.  465 ,  467–71 ( 2013 ) ;  Jane C.  Ginsburg , 
 From Having Copies to Experiencing Works ,  50  J. Copyright Soc’y  113 ,  121–22 &n.21 ( 2002 ) ;  Aaron 
 Perzanowski ,  Fixing RAM Copies ,  104  Northwestern L. Rev .  1067 ( 2010 ) . 
 30  See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 24 (2001) 
(Serial # 107-52) (testimony of Cary Sherman, Recording Industry Ass’n of Am.); Reply Memorandum 
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in 1976 to make RAM copies actionable; all the available evidence supports the 
contrary view. The doctrine that the reproduction right encompassed RAM copies, 
rather, resulted from a combination of ambitious lawyering, clueless judging, and 
dumb luck. 
 When Congress enacted the 1976 Act, it limited eligibility for copyright protection 
and the scope of the reproduction right to tangible embodiments of works. The 
statute’s defi nitions of copies and fi xation, Congress wrote, “would exclude from 
the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected 
briefl y on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or 
captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.” 31 In 1991, though, customer 
service manager Eric Francis and three of his coworkers left their jobs at MAI 
Computing to work for a competitor. In his new job, Francis serviced and maintained 
computers leased to customers by his former employer. MAI fi led suit against Francis 
and his new employer on a variety of grounds, including copyright infringement, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark infringement, false advertising, and 
unfair competition. Francis had signed non-disclosure and non-compete agreements 
with MAI. The district court judge was apparently convinced that he had grievously 
injured his former employer, because Judge Real granted MAI’s motion for a 
summary judgment on the trade secrecy claim, and, for good measure, also granted 
MAI’s summary judgment on the copyright, trademark, false advertising, and unfair 
competition claims. 32 The court based its copyright infringement determination on 
two uses: fi rst, Peak had computers on its premises that ran MAI software for which 
it had not secured licenses, and second, Peak’s employees ran MAI software on 
customers’ MAI computers when they serviced them. The court reasoned that
 the loading of copyrighted computer software from a storage medium (hard disk, 
fl oppy disk, or read only memory) into the memory of a central processing unit 
(“CPU”) causes a copy to be made. In the absence of ownership of the copyright or 
express permission by license, such acts constitute copyright infringement. 33 
 Peak appealed to the 9th Circuit, which affi rmed. The court of appeals agreed 
with MAI that when Peak employees turned on computers leased from MAI on its 
customers’ premises, an infringing copy resulted. 
 Peak concedes that in maintaining its customer’s computers, it uses MAI operating 
software “to the extent that the repair and maintenance process necessarily involves 
of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff’s motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 5n.1, Capitol Records 
v. Redigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (SDNY 2013) (No. 12-Civ-0095);  infra  note 44 and accompanying text. 
 31  H. R. Rep. 1476, 94th Cong. 53 (1976). 
 32  MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 991 F2d 511 (9th Cir 1993), aff’g 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 (C.D. 
Cal. 1992). 
 33  1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS at *36-*37. 
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turning on the computer to make sure it is functional and thereby running the 
operating system.” It is also uncontroverted that when the computer is turned on 
the operating system is loaded into the computer’s RAM. As part of diagnosing a 
computer problem at the customer site, the Peak technician runs the computer’s 
operating system software, allowing the technician to view the systems error log, 
which is part of the operating system, thereby enabling the technician to diagnose 
the problem. 
 Peak argues that this loading of copyrighted software does not constitute a copyright 
violation because the “copy” created in RAM is not “fi xed.” However, by showing 
that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then able to view the system 
error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI has adequately shown 
that the representation created in the RAM is “suffi ciently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration.” 34 
 This reasoning was unexpected. 35 Representative Joe Knollenberg introduced a 
bill to reverse the result. 36 Copyright owners, though, having been handed a shiny 
new tool, were loath to give it up. Colleagues persuaded Representative Knollenberg 
to narrow his legislation so that it permitted computer maintenance and repair 
fi rms, but not others, to turn on computers without incurring liability for copyright 
infringement. 37 Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration Task Force on the National 
Information Infrastructure seized on the RAM copy notion to support a vision of 
the Internet for which every individual would need copyright permission to look 
at or listen to anything posted online. 38 Congress enacted Knollenberg’s narrowed 
 34  991 F.2d at 519. 
 35  See, e.g.,  Michael E.  Johnson ,  Note:  The Uncertain Future of Computer Software Users’ Rights 
in the Aftermatch of MAI Systems ,  44  Duke L.  J.  327 ( 1994 ) ;  Jule L.  Sigall ,  Comment: Copyright 
Infringement was Never this Easy: RAM Copies and their Impact on the Scope of Copyright Protection 
in Computer Programs ,  45  Catholic U. L. Rev .  181 ( 1995 ) ; Pamela Samuelson,  Legally Speaking: The 
NII Intellectual Property Report , Communications of the ACM, at 21 (Dec. 1994). 
 36  H.R. 533, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 37  See H.R. 72, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 Cong. Rec. E21 (Jan. 1, 1997) (remarks of rep. Knollenberg); 143 
Cong. Rec. H7102 (remarks of Rep. Knollenberg). Congress enacted the narrowed legislation as title 
III of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
 38  See Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure 64–6 (1995), at  www.uspto.gov/web/offi ces/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf . The White House’s 
Information Infrastructure Task Force authored a White Paper Report that became the basis for the 
1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860, and for the U.S. negotiating 
position in connection with some of the provisions of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Treaties discussed  infra  notes 59–61 and accompanying text. The White Paper asserted that 
whenever a computer user viewed a fi le that resided on a remote computer, the image on the user’s 
screen and the copies of the fi le made by every computer that helped to transfer the fi le would be 
potentially infringing copies. Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure, 
 supra , at 65–66. 
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legislation and asked the Copyright Offi ce to study the issue. 39 The Copyright Offi ce 
reported that RAM copies should be deemed within the scope of the copyright owner’s 
reproduction right. “In establishing the dividing line between those reproductions that 
are subject to the reproduction right and those that are not, we believe that Congress 
intended the copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend to all reproductions from 
which economic value can be derived.” 40 A statutory exemption for temporary copies 
incidental to lawful uses was not warranted, the Copyright Offi ce concluded, because 
advocates for users had failed to make a compelling case that such an exemption was 
necessary. 41 Meanwhile, the Offi ce characterized the risks of adding a new privilege to 
the statute as “signifi cant:” 
 Copyright owners have pointed out with justifi cation that the reproduction right is 
the “cornerstone of the edifi ce of copyright protection” and that exceptions from 
that right should not be made lightly. In the absence of specifi c, identifi able harm, 
the risk of foreclosing legitimate business opportunities based on copyright owners’ 
exploitation of their exclusive reproduction right counsels against creating a broad 
exception to that right. 42 
 Even though the Register of Copyrights explained to Congress that RAM copies 
should be deemed to be actionable reproductions, 43 she appears not to have fully 
believed it. When the introduction of software that allowed individual viewers to 
skip sexually explicit or violent scenes in DVDs they watched inspired a copyright 
infringement suit, the Register testifi ed to Congress that there was no need to amend 
the copyright law because using the software did not infringe any copyrights. That was 
so, she insisted, because the censored versions of the fi lm created by the software were 
never fi xed. 44 But, of course, if RAM copies are copies, the censored versions of the 
 39  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105–304 §§ 104, 301, 302, 112 Stat. 2860, 2876, 2886, 2887 
(Oct. 28, 1998). 
 40  U.S. Copyright Offi ce, DMCA Section 104 Report (2001),  www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/
sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf . 
 41  Id. at 130. 
 42  Id. at 142. The Copyright Offi ce did support a narrow amendment to relieve licensed digital transmitters 
of sound recordings from liability for buffer copies that were incidental to the licensed transmissions. 
The Offi ce thought that such buffer copies should be sheltered by the fair use privilege, but expressed 
sympathy for webcasters who faced copyright owners’ demand for double compensation. See id. at 
142–46. 
 43  See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. of Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 107th 
Cong. 15 (2001) (Serial # 107-52) (Statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (“we 
recommend against the adoption of a general exemption from the reproduction right to render 
noninfringing all temporary copies that are incidental to lawful uses”), also at  www.copyright.gov/
docs/regstat121201.html . 
 44  See the Family Movie Act: Hearing on H.R. 4077 Before the Subcomm. of Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. 28 (2004) (Serial # 108-94) 
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fi lm were fi xed in the DVD players’ RAM. That is, after all, how the software enabled 
viewers to skip scenes. 
 Some courts adopted the 9th Circuit’s reasoning, 45 although many decisions 
purporting to follow the decision applied it to indisputably fi xed copies of software 
installed on computers and saved in durable computer storage. 46 Other courts 
reasoned around it. 47 In many other cases in which it might have had determinative 
effect, neither party raised it. 48 
 Twenty years after the MAI opinion, a Commerce Department task force report 
characterized the RAM copy doctrine as well-settled:
 The right to reproduce a work in copies is the fi rst and most fundamental of the 
bundle of rights that make up a copyright. In the online environment, this right 
is even more central, as copies are made in the course of virtually every network 
transmission of a digital copy. Temporary copies may be a key aspect of the value of 
the use in some circumstances, but merely incidental in others. 
 The ability to control temporary copying in digital devices has long been important 
to rights owners. For software in particular, consumers increasingly engage in the 
exploitation of software they receive over a network without ever knowingly storing 
a permanent copy on their hard drive. Temporary copies are also prevalent in 
the context of streaming sound recordings and video, where “buffer copies” are a 
technologically necessary step in the delivery of content to the consumer. 
 It has long been clear in U.S. law that the reproduction right is not limited solely 
to the making of “permanent” physical copies. The statutory defi nitions cover any 
fi xation “suffi ciently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” In the 
seminal 1993 case v., the Ninth Circuit applied these defi nitions to hold that when 
(Statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (“There is no infringement of the reproduction 
right because no unauthorized copies of the motion pictures are made”). While agreeing with the 
Register that the censored versions of the fi lms created by this technology were not fi xed, the Motion 
Picture Association of America’s Jack Valenti nonetheless opposed the bill because it threatened to 
undermine the right to make derivative works: “The law tells us, with great clarity, that the owner of 
a copyrighted work – and only that owner – has the authority to decide if someone else may produce 
a product derived from that copyrighted work . . . The movie fi ltering bill would seriously erode that 
core right by legalizing businesses that sell technology, for a profi t, which can ‘skip and mute’ scenes 
or dialogue to create an abridged version of a movie, as long as no ‘fi xed copy’ of the altered version is 
created.” Id. at 38. 
 45  See, e.g., Quantum Systems Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 338 Fed. Appx. 329, 336–7 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. 
Utah 1999); Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368–73 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 46  See, e.g., Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 90 (DC Cir 1998). 
 47  See, e.g., Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F3d 121 (2d Cir 2008); DSC Communications Corp. 
v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 
F.3d 231, 235–36 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 48  See, e.g., Flava Works v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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a program is loaded into RAM, a copy is created. In a 2001 Report, the Copyright 
Offi ce confi rmed its agreement, noting that “[a] lthough it is theoretically possible 
that information . . . could be stored in RAM for such a short period of time that 
it could not be retrieved, displayed, copied or communicated, this is unlikely to 
happen in practice.” 49 
 My own story about the RAM copy and the  MAI case is that is that the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals just made a mistake – courts do that all the time. 50 MAI’s victory 
on its copyright infringement claim was improbable, but once it fell into copyright 
owners’ laps, they became determined to retain it, even if they couldn’t fi gure out 
exactly how to use it. If we cling to the determination that all RAM copies are actually 
actionable, though, and if we take it seriously, the reproduction right morphs into 
an all-purpose use right, covering, e.g., playing DVDs on a DVD player, watching 
TV on a digital TV; reading any ebook; or listening to music on a smartphone or 
MP3 player. That’s not sustainable. All private performances on digital devices turn 
into actionable reproductions. This would be a major incursion on the interests 
of readers, listeners, and viewers, who have until now been able to count on a 
signifi cant zone of freedom within which they can enjoy works of authorship that 
they have purchased or licensed. 
 The problem with the RAM copy is that making a RAM copy is just another 
name for private performance or display, which is to say, reading, listening, and 
viewing. 51 Private performance and display are not actionable. The copyright act has 
historically divided reproduction and distribution, and later, public performance, 
from reading, listening, and watching. The copyright owner has (some) control over 
the former activities but not the latter, because unfettered reading, listening, and 
viewing are as crucial to the promotion of the progress of science as encouraging the 
creation of new works. One half of the equation is meaningless without the other. 
 It has never before been copyright infringement to read a book, even if it turns 
out that the book is plagiarized from an earlier book. I can listen to an infringing 
recording or look at an infringing photograph without fear of liability. The RAM copy 
notion suddenly imposes liability for seeing, hearing, or enjoying any work using 
digital technology. There’s no policy justifi cation for that expansion in copyright 
scope: yes, if my reading the wrong ebook makes me an infringer, one can sue the 
ebook publisher as a contributory infringer, but one can sue the ebook publisher 
as a direct infringer anyway, so the only real effect is to burden and deter reading. 
 49  Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force Report,  supra  note 1 , at 12–13(footnotes omitted). 
 50  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 51  See, e.g.,  Jessica  Litman ,  The Exclusive Right to Read ,  13  Cardozo Arts Ent. L.  J.  29 ,  31 – 32 
( 1994 ) . Contrast the approach taken by the European Union: see, e.g., Public Relations Consultants 
Association v. Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors (Judgment of the Court) [2014] EUECJ 
C-360/13 (5 June 2014) (holding RAM copies non-infringing under EU Directive). 
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A copyright system designed to deter reading has completely lost its moorings and 
forgotten its purpose. 
 As we move to increasing reliance on cloud computing, the problem becomes 
more acute. Every time an individual views, hears, reads, or edits her fi les in the 
cloud, she creates potentially actionable RAM copies. If she commits prima facie 
infringement against the owners of rights in the songs, stories, software, movies, and 
other expression in those fi les whenever she consults them, then centuries of key 
reader liberties will have vaporized. 
 A more recent outbreak of copy-fetish has inspired the quest for an expansive 
“making available” right. The essence of infringement of the making available right 
is the possession of a copy (legitimate or not) that is accessible to other people. Again, 
the story begins with a diffi cult-to-justify opinion from a Court of Appeals. In  Hotaling 
v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints , the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that “a library distributes a published work, within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act . . . when it places an unauthorized copy of the work in its collection, 
includes the copy in its catalog or index system, and makes the copy available to the 
public.” 52 Donna and William Hotaling sued the Mormon Church because Donna 
had discovered an unauthorized microfi che copy of her genealogical research in 
the Church library. The Church had purchased an authorized copy in 1985, and 
had made unlicensed microfi che copies for its branch libraries. In 1991, when the 
Hotalings discovered the unlicensed copies and complained, the church recalled 
and destroyed them, but retained a single microfi che copy as a replacement for its 
original purchased copy, which had been inadvertently destroyed. 53 In 1995, Donna 
visited the church’s main library, discovered the microfi che copy, and fi led suit. The 
church acknowledged having made the microfi che copy years earlier, but insisted 
that it had engaged in no reproduction or distribution within the 3-year limitations 
period. The library allowed patrons to consult materials on the premises, but did not 
permit them to check those materials out of the library. 54 Thus, the church insisted, 
it had not distributed any copies of the copyrighted work to the public. 55 
 A divided Fourth Circuit concluded that the combination of possessing an 
unauthorized copy, listing the work in its card catalogue, and enabling members 
to the public to view the copy on its premises, should be deemed to be distribution, 
even though the copy didn’t leave the library. 56 As an interpretation of statutory 
 52  Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 118 F. 3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 53  The church argued that its retention of this copy was authorized by 17 USC § 108(c). The 4th Circuit 
declined to reach that question. Id. at 204. 
 54  Id. at 205 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
 55  Id. at 203. 
 56  Id. 
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language that restricts distribution to the conveyance of copies to the public “by 
sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or lending,” the decision 
seems indefensible. 57 Some observers theorized that the Fourth Circuit had been 
infl uenced by evidence that the library had engaged in unauthorized reproductions 
and distributions outside of the limitations period. 58 
 Coincidentally, the phrase “making available” also appeared in a pair of copyright 
treaties negotiated in 1996 (a year before the  Hotaling decision) and ratifi ed by the 
United States in 1998 (a year after  Hotaling ). The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty obliged signatory nations to protect 
authors’ “exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the 
original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of ownership” 59 
and their “exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their 
works by wired or wireless means, including the making available to the public 
of their works. . . .” 60 The two “making available” provisions limited themselves, in 
terms, to making available by transferring copies to the public and making available 
by transmitting works to the public by wired or wireless means. At the time that 
Congress implemented the treaties, supporters assured Congress that extant U.S. law 
amply provided for the exclusive rights of communicating a work to the public. The 
making available provisions of the treaties were coextensive with the U.S. statute’s 
rights, under section 106 to distribute copies (“by sale or other transfer of ownership 
or by rental, lease, or lending”) and to perform or display a work publicly. 61 
 57  See, e.g.,  William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 13.9 (2014). But see  Joseph F.  Key ,  Recent 
Decisions: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ,  57  Md. L. Rev .  1157 ,  1174 ( 1998 ) (arguing 
that the decision was correct even though it was inconsistent with the statutory language because of 
the “unique nature of non-circulating research material in the library context”). 
 58  See, e.g.,  Robert  Kasunic ,  Making Circumstantial Proof of Distribution Available ,  18  Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment L. J.  1145 , 1149n.14, 1153n.28 ( 2008 ) . 
 59  WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 6.  See also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 8 
(“Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of 
the original and copies of their performances fi xed in phonograms through sale or other transfer of 
ownership.”). 
 60  WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8; see also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 10 
(“Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of their 
performances fi xed in phonograms, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”). 
 61  See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Liability Limitation 
Act: Hearing on HR 2281 and HR 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property 
of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43- 54 (1997) (Serial # 105-33) (testimony of 
MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights); id. at 72–3 (statement of Robert Holleyman, President, 
Business Software Alliance). As should be evident, the conduct at issue in  Hotaling neither involved 
“sale or other transfer of ownership” nor “communication to the public by wired or wireless means,” 
so it would have fallen outside the making available rights secured by the language of the treaties. 
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 The  Hotaling opinion’s expansion of the statutory distribution right to encompass 
something it called “making available” that did not involve the transfer or loan 
of copies might have been limited to that case’s particular circumstances were it 
not for the fact that the Fourth Circuit’s analysis scratched an itch that troubled 
the recording industry. After Napster appeared on the scene, record labels faced 
diffi culty demonstrating that their sound recordings had been reproduced or 
distributed to the public by the users of peer-to-peer fi le sharing software. It was 
easy for their investigators to ascertain that individual users had copies of particular 
recordings in the “share” fi les associated with their peer-to-peer clients, but not to 
determine where those copies had come from, nor whether other members of the 
public had copied them. 
 The recording industry seized on the  Hotaling decision as a solution to that 
problem. Citing  Hotaling , the labels argued that they did not need to introduce 
evidence of actual copying of any recordings because the presence of a fi le in a 
share directory, without more, violated the public distribution right by making the 
fi le available for copying. 62 Other copyright owners followed. Motion picture studios 
insisted that the making available right included in the treaties entitled copyright 
owners to control any offering of copyrighted works to the public, without regard to 
the actual distribution of copies. 63 The  Perfect 10 magazine and website argued that, 
under  Hotaling , search engines violated its distribution right when they returned 
search results that included links to infringing copies of its erotic photographs. 64 
Some courts were persuaded. 65 Other courts found the argument that “making 
available” should be deemed distribution of a copy to the public “by sale or other 
transfer of ownership or by rental lease or lending” inconsistent with the text of 
section 106(3). 66 Copyright scholar Peter Menell, in a highly selective exploration of 
the statute’s legislative history, claimed to have discovered evidence that Congress 
had intended courts to fi nd a violation of the distribution right whenever unlicensed 
 62  See, e.g., Atlantic Recording v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981–84 (D. Az 2008); In re Napster, Inc. 
Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802–05 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 63  See Brief of MPAA as Amicus Curiae, Capitol Records v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn 
2008) (No. 06-1497), at  www.eff.org/node/55647 . 
 64  See Brief of Appellant Perfect 10, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir 2007)  (No. 
06-55405), 2006 US 9th Cir. Briefs 55406, at 41–42. 
 65  See, e.g., UMG Recordings v.  Green, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 39305 (ND NY 2009); Sony BMG 
Music v. Doe, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 106088 (ED NC 2008); Universal City Studios v. Bigwood, 441 
F. Supp. 2d 185 (D Me 2006). 
 66  See, e.g., Atlantic Recording v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Az 2008); Capitol Records v. Thomas, 
579 F. Supp.  2d 1210, 1216–26 (D. Minn 2008); London-Sire Records v. Doe, 542 F. Supp.  2d 153 
(D. Mass, 2008); Elektra Entertainment v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (SDNY 2008). See also Capitol 
Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir 2012) (declining to reach issue); Arista Record v. Doe, 
604 F.  3d 110 (2010) (same); Maverick Recording v. Harper, 598 F.  3d 193 (5th Cir. 2010)  (same); 
Warner Brothers Records v. Walker, 704 F. Supp. 460 (WD Pa 2010) (same). 
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copies were made available to the public. 67 For the majority of courts, though, the 
diffi culty of squaring that interpretation with the statutory language dissuaded them 
from interpreting the distribution right to encompass making available without the 
transfer of tangible copies. 68 
 Advocates for copyright owners have continued to argue that  Hotaling was 
correctly decided, that the  Hotaling construction represented the true meaning of 
the “making available” language in the WIPO treaties, and that the U.S. adherence 
to the WIPO Treaties therefore requires U.S. copyright law to give owners a robust 
right to recover for the existence of unlicensed, publicly accessible copies, whether 
or not any transfer of copies or public transmission has occurred. 69 A broad making 
available right, untethered to actual distributions or public performances, would give 
copyright owners a formidable weapon to deploy against Internet-enabled digital 
video recorders, cyberlockers, search engines, and cloud storage. Having glimpsed a 
law that would empower them to lay claim to control all publicly accessible copies, 
copyright owners are disinclined to give it up. 
 The Copyright Offi ce is currently conducting a study on the making available 
right. 70 The premise of the study appears to be that if the U.S. law’s protection of 
a making available right falls short of the right as defi ned by  Hotaling, Congress 
should intervene to correct the problem. At a hearing in May 2014, the offi ce 
expressed its position that U.S.  copyright law  should include a broad making 
available right and indicated that it would focus its study on whether it was 
 67  Peter S  Menell ,  In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet 
Age , 59  J. Copyright Soc’y  201 ,  233–66 ( 2012 ) . 
 68  See, e.g., Fox Broadcasting v. Dish Network, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (CD Cal 2012), aff’d 723 F.3d 1067 
(9th Cir 2013); Shannon’s Rainbow LLV v. Supernova Media, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 9275 (D. Ut. 2011). 
See generally Patry,  supra  note 57 at § 13.9. 
 69  See, e.g., Capitol Records v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn 2008); U.S. Copyright 
Offi ce, Public Roundtable on the Right of Making Available, May 5, 2014, at  www.copyright 
 .gov/docs/making_available/public-roundtable/transcript.pdf , at pages 329–32 (remarks of Steve 
Tep, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Comments of the MPAA and the RIAA Before the Copyright 
Offi ce In the Matter of Study of the Right of Making Available (April 4, 2014),  www.copyright 
 .gov/docs/making_available/comments/docket2014_2/MPAA.pdf at 3 (“Where a party provides 
the public access to copyrighted works via the Internet without authorization – as a download, 
a stream, a link or otherwise – that party infringes one or more of the affected copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights under Section 106 of the Act. It is not necessary to prove that any user 
actually availed herself of such access.”); Brief Amici Curiae of International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry et al. at 13–15, ABC v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No 13–461), at  http://
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/13-461_pet_amcu_ifpi-etal.authcheckdam 
 .pdf ; Thomas Syndor, The Making Available Right Under U.S. Law, 16 Progress on Point 
no. 7, Progress & Freedom Foundation (March 2009). See William F. Patry, MPAA’s Brief and 
Charming Betsy, Patry Copyright Blog, June 24, 2008 at  http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/06/
mpaas-brief-and-charming-betsy.html . 
 70  See  http://copyright.gov/docs/making_available/ 
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necessary to amend the law to make such a right robust, and, if so, how such an 
amendment should be cast. 71 
 As the notion of actionable RAM copies transforms ordinary acts of reading, 
listening, and using into copyright infringement, a making available right potentially 
imposes liability for having copies, without more, as well as for posting hyperlinks 
or citations to copies one doesn’t have. The combination of these two instances of 
copy-fetish jeopardizes copyright law’s longstanding protection of the interests of 
readers, listeners, and viewers. 
 Copy-fetishists have demonstrated that they view the mere existence of any 
unlicensed copy as an invasion of their prerogatives. In the  HathiTrust case, the 
Authors Guild was willing to spend millions of dollars in an effort to ensure that even 
invisible unlicensed copies were eradicated. The bare possibility that an unlicensed 
copy might somehow escape into the wild was, the Authors Guild argued, itself 
irreparable harm. 72 In  Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset , the recording industry was 
willing to shell out for three jury trials and an appeal to the 8th Circuit against a 
judgment-proof defendant in the hope of establishing the illegality of having a fi le in 
the share directory of a peer-to-peer fi le sharing client. Neither lawsuit accomplished 
its larger doctrinal objective, but failing to persuade the courts appears to have 
galvanized copyright owners’ determination to procure legislation that repudiates 
those losses. 
 As the U.S. Congress takes its fi rst serious look in many years at a comprehensive 
revision of the copyright law, the possibility that readers’ copyright interests will 
be swallowed up by a series of new copyright owner rights and remedies seems 
signifi cant. Most people are aware that copyright statutes are made when lawyers 
for copyright owners and commercial and institutional copyright users get together 
and fi gure out a compromise that most of them can live with. It’s not news that 
copyright-affected industries have thoroughly captured the Copyright Offi ce, 
the White House, the Commerce Department, and Congress. 73 At least up until 
now, readers and listeners and viewers have never gotten an offi cial seat at the 
negotiating table. Indeed, institutions, businesses, and NGOs who have claimed to 
be advancing the interests of users have found themselves demoted, and banished 
to the children’s table. (That’s the best description I can come up with for CONFU, 
the mid-1990s Conference on Fair Use that was devised to ensure that contentious 
 71  U.S. Copyright Offi ce, Public Roundtable on the Right of Making Available, May 5, 2014, at  www 
 .copyright.gov/docs/making_available/public-roundtable/transcript.pdf . 
 72  Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s motion for Summary Judgment at 23, Authors Guild 
v.  Hathitrust, 902 F.  Supp.  2d 445(SDNY 2012)  (No. 11-Civ-6351), at  www.thepublicindex.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/19/docs/cases/hathitrust/115-ag-sj-brief.pdf ; 
 73  See, e.g., Kaminski,  supra  note 12 , at 988-1005;  Deborah  Tussey ,  UCITA, Copyright and Capture ,  21 
 Cardozo Arts & Enter. L. J.  319 ,  321–22 ( 2003 ) . 
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disputes about the scope of fair use in the digital realm did not delay enactment of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 74 It bears some explanatory power, as well, 
for the section 108 study group convened in 2005 to defi ne the scope of new library 
privileges. 75 ) 
 The Register of Copyrights has now called on Congress to enact the “next great 
copyright act.” 76 The House Judiciary Committee held 19 hearings on copyright 
issues during the 113th Congress in what was billed as a comprehensive reexamination 
of the copyright system. 77 The committee heard from scores of witnesse testifying 
 74  See  www.uspto.gov/web/offi ces/dcom/olia/confu/confurep.pdf . In connection with the enactment of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, discussions on the appropriate scope of fair use in the digital 
environment were diverted to a conference of fair use, in which many stakeholders met, argued, 
and failed to reach consensus. Meanwhile, supporters of the new legislation shepherded it through 
Congress without allocating Congressional attention to fair use questions. When fair use nonetheless 
appeared late in the game in connection with the bill’s anticircumvention provisions, those questions 
were themselves diverted to a triennial copyright offi ce rulemaking. See Jessica Litman, Digital 
Copyright 122–45 (2006). 
 75  See  www.section108.gov/docs/Sec108StudyGroupReport.pdf . The Section 108 Study Group was a 
group assembled by the Copyright Offi ce and charged with recommending revision to the hopeless 
outdated library reproduction privileges in section 108 of the copyright act. The group was co-chaired 
by a librarian and a publisher; it included members from libraries, museums, archives, book 
publishers, journal publishers, fi lm studios, and software publishers. Like CONFU, it failed to reach 
consensus on proposals to amend the law. 
 76  See  http://copyright.gov/regstat/2013/regstat03202013.html ;  www.copyright.gov/docs/next_great_
copyright_act.pdf . 
 77  See Copyright Issues in Education and For the Visually Impaired: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) 
(Serial # 113-119); Oversight of the U.S. Copyright Offi ce: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial 
# 113-116); Chapter  12 of Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-115); Copyright 
Remedies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the 
House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-107); Moral Rights, Termination Rights, 
Resale Royalty, And Copyright Term: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm.,113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-103); Music Licensing 
Under Title 17 Parts One And Two: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm.,113 the Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-105); Hearing: First 
Sale Under Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet 
of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-98); Compulsory Video Licenses Of 
Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the 
House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-89); Hearing: Preservation And Reuse Of 
Copyrighted Works: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet 
of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-88); Section 512 Of Title 17: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 
113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-86); The Scope Of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 
113-82); The Scope Of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (Serial # 113-81); Satellite 
Television Laws In Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
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about what they thought was right and wrong with current copyright law. Witnesses 
speaking on behalf of readers, listeners, and viewers were in short supply. 78 As 
copyright owners have pressed Congress to recognize or clarify a more expansive 
scope for reproduction and distribution rights, supporters of enhanced copyright 
protection have defl ected calls for recognition or clarifi cation of readers’ and 
listeners’ liberties. They insist that readers have failed to make a compelling showing 
that current legal ambiguities cause them meaningful harm. 79 Any new or expanded 
privileges or exceptions, they argue, would pose a grave danger of injuring the 
creators and owners of copyrighted works. 80 
Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (Serial # 113-48); Innovation In America 
(Part I And II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet 
of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (Serial # 113-47); A Case Study For Consensus 
Building: The Copyright Principles Project: Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 
(2013); The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the House Judiciary 
Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (Serial # 113-20). See also The Role of Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. 
Copyright System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of 
the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (Serial # 113-49) (subcommittee hearing on voluntary 
agreements to address piracy of copyrighted works); Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless 
Competition Act, Hearing on H.R. 1123 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Internet of the House Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (Serial # 113-27) (subcommittee 
hearing on restoring the telephone unlocking exception to § 1201). 
 78  Five of the hearings included witnesses from nonprofi t organizations that represent some aspect of 
the public’s interest in copyright. The Hearing on Copyright First Sale included witnesses Jonathan 
Band on behalf of an organization named the Owners Rights Initiative, which advances the rights of 
copy buyers, and Sherwin Sy for Public Knowledge. Sy testifi ed again at a later hearing on copyright 
remedies. The Hearing on the Scope of Fair Use included novelist Naomi Novik testifying for the 
Organization for Transformative Works. The Hearing on the Scope of Copyright included Jamie 
Love for Public Knowledge International. The Hearing on Issues in Education and for the Visually 
Impaired included witness Scott LeBarre for the National Federation for the Blind and Jack Bernard 
for the Association of American Universities. In addition, several hearings included law professor 
witnesses, and some of the law professors testifi ed that a wise copyright law would take the interests of 
members of the public seriously. 
 79  See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use Hearing,  supra  note 77 , at 104–11 (statement submitted by the 
Association of American Publishers); Copyright Offi ce Section 104 Report,  supra  note 40 , at 73–7, 
96–101, 130; Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force Report,  supra  note 1 , at 35–38. 
 80  See, e.g., Copyright Offi ce Section 104 Report,  supra  note 40 , at 99; The DMCA Section 104 Report 
Hearing,  supra  note 43 , at 18 (testimony of Carey Ramos on behalf of the National Music Publishers 
Ass’n); id. at 46 (testimony of Emery Simon, Business Software Alliance); Unlocking Consumer 
Choice and Wireless Competition Act: Hearing on H.R. 1123,  supra  note 77 , at 54–58 (colloquy); First 
Sale Under Title 17,  supra  note 77 , at 108–09 (testimony of Emery Simon, BSA|The Software Alliance); 
id. at 95–96 (testimony of John Villasenor, Brookings Institution fellow); Digital Media Consumers 
Rights: Hearing on HR 107 Before the Commerce Subcomm. of the House Energy & Commerce 
Com., 108th Cong. (2004) (Serial # 108-109) (testimony Of Cary A Sherman, Recording Industry As’sn 
of Am.); Recording Industry Association of America, Comments Concerning Promotion of Distance 
Education Through Digital Technologies, Docket No. 98-12A (Feb. 5, 1999), at  http://copyright.gov/
disted/comments/init023.pdf . 
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 I’ve focused on two manifestations of copy-fetish that originated, I contend, in 
doctrinal mistakes by courts of appeals. Copyright owners’ advocates are clinging 
to both of them, and have enlisted the support of the Copyright Offi ce, the Patent 
Offi ce, The Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the 
White House in their efforts to incorporate them into the law. That doesn’t make 
these expansions of copyright a done deal – the support of all of these actors for 
drastic “rogue websites” legislation didn’t stop the defeat of Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA). 81 It makes it unlikely, though, that any signifi cant copyright revision bill 
will fail to incorporate them. The extent to which both expansions of owner rights 
pose signifi cant threats to readers’ interests simply is not salient to most of the policy 
makers involved in the debate. If copyright owners insist that it isn’t appropriate 
to consider the interests of readers when crafting the next great copyright act, we 
can predict with some confi dence that readers’ rights will get short shrift. And that 
should worry all of us. 
 If copyright owners’ control of the copyright legislative process all but guarantees 
that copyright’s exclusive rights will expand further to encroach on reader, listener, 
and viewer liberties, then it becomes important to make those liberties explicit in 
the statute, and to defi ne them with suffi cient generosity and fl exibility that they will 
survive technological innovation. Just as we want to promote creative authorship, we 
should also seek to encourage creative readership. Imaginative readers are valuable 
for many of the same reasons we prize imaginative authors. 82 It may be that we could 
rely on fair use and implicit reader privileges to continue to shelter creative reading 
rather than making readers’ copyright liberties explicit. It’s even possible that fair 
use and implicit reader privileges would give creative reading a broader shelter than 
any express exception or limitation that copyright owners will permit Congress to 
enact. But, when we fail to include express protections for the interests of readers, 
listeners, and viewers in the law, we lose an opportunity to express the importance of 
readers’ interests in the copyright system. Affi rming the core importance of readers, 
listeners, and viewers in the copyright ecosystem is an essential step toward restoring 
the public’s respect for the copyright law. Giving explicit voice to the importance of 
readers’ interests, meanwhile, may remind copyright owners that Congress has given 
them exclusive rights at least in part in the service of larger goals. 
 81  See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman,  In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old , N.Y. 
 Times , January 18, 2012, at  www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests-piracy-bill-and-2-
key-senators-change-course.html . 
 82  Consider the problems and opportunities posed by fan works. In theory, the most challenging uses to 
authors’ rights would be the creation and widespread dissemination of fan fi ction, fan video, and fan 
art. Yet, as many copyright owners have discovered, noncommercial fan works redound to the benefi t 
of the copyright owners’ bottom line. This shouldn’t be surprising: the author/reader relationship is 
interactive rather than static, and the most devoted readers are the ones who feel invited to participate 
in the experience that the author communicates to them. 
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 So, when I speak of explicit statutory readers’ rights, what am I imagining? 
 The copyright rights that readers, listeners, and viewers need are modest unless 
one is a copy-fetishist: Individuals who make lawful use of works should be entitled 
to take a variety of actions that may enhance those uses. 83 Such an individual should 
have the right to make copies incidental to the lawful use, and to adapt the work to 
suit her needs. She should be able to store those copies where and as she wants to. She 
should be entitled to extract and use any material that is not protected by copyright – 
facts, ideas, processes, or expression that is in the public domain – even if doing so 
requires making another copy or defeating technological protections. She should not 
face liability for using citations, hyperlinks, or other information location tools to refer 
other readers to the work. She should be able to time-shift or format-shift her copy of 
the work; she should be entitled to loan, sell, or give her copies away to someone else, 
whether those copies are analog or digital. 84 She should be encouraged to enjoy the 
work, interact with it, revise it, describe it, respond to it, and share her responses with 
others, privately or publicly. 85 She should be able to do all of this with a reasonable 
expectation that her intellectual privacy will be respected. 86 
 Those are very modest rights. If my list sounds ridiculously radical to you, recall 
that all of these uses represent behavior that readers, listeners, and viewers engaged 
in, completely lawfully, every day, before the wide deployment of networked digital 
technology. 87 The fact that the whole world has been linked up over digital networks 
hasn’t changed the essence of reading, and interactive engagement with works of 
authorship is as crucial an aspect of reading (and listening and viewing) today as it 
was 40 years ago. None of the freedoms I enumerated need morph into a privilege to 
commercialize a work. All of the user rights I mentioned will, I believe, encourage 
respect for the copyright system and the process of authorship, and promote reader 
engagement in copyright norms. 
 83  See, e.g., Ginsburg,  supra  note 2 , at 12 (“Where one has a lawful access to the work, there may be an 
implied right to enjoy the work in a manner convenient to the consumer.”). 
 84  See  Aaron  Perzanowski &  Jason  Schultz ,  Legislating Digital Exhaustion ,  29  Berkeley Tech. L. J. 
 1535 (2014) . The current section 117 of the copyright act limits the right to transfer consumers’ copies of 
computer programs by requiring that any transfer include both the original copy and all copies made 
by the consumer. The same general principle could be extended to copies of other classes of works. 
See id. at 1546–57. 
 85  See  Rebecca  Tushnet ,  Scary Monsters, Hybrid Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children ,  86 
 Notre Dame L. Rev .  2133 ( 2011 ) ;  Rebecca  Tusnet ,  I Put You There: User Generated Content and 
Anticircumvention ,  12  Vand. J. Art Tech .  889 ( 2010 ) . 
 86  See  Julie E.  Cohen ,  What Privacy is For ,  126  Harvard L. Rev . ( 2013 ) ;  Julie E.  Cohen ,  Intellectual 
Privacy and Censorship of the Internet ,  8  Seton Hall Const. L. J.  693 ( 1998 ) ;  Neil M.  Richards , 
 Intellectual Privacy ,  87  Tex. L. Rev.  387 ( 2008 ) . 
 87  Those are the same core reader freedoms that copyright law has always given readers, until recently, by 
cabining the scope of copyright rights so that copyright impinges only minimally on reader liberties. 
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 I imagine that some readers are thinking:  “Why can’t we rely on licensing to 
permit uses like this? If an author thinks that it’s important to permit readers to make 
this use or that use, then surely the author will license those uses.” 88 
 We’ve learned that doesn’t work. First, and most obviously, the author is often not 
the licensing agent. Most academic authors are delighted when scholars and teachers 
want to make use of their work in any way at all, but if the authors have assigned their 
copyrights to publishers, their enthusiasm for the use is worse than irrelevant. 89 The 
popular press is full of articles about performers whose record companies decline to 
release their recordings, but refuse to return them to the artists. 90 Recording artists 
who welcomed peer-to-peer fi le sharing had no grounds on which to overrule their 
labels. 91 While individual creators may prefer that their works be read, seen, heard, 
and used as widely as possible, owners of the copyrights in multiple works may have 
other interests: they may, for example, want to protect their more profi table works 
from the competition that might arise if their less profi table works were readily 
available. They may have business plans that do not rely on widespread licensing. 
Consider the sad story of George Clinton, who has said that he would happily 
offer inexpensive sample licenses for Funkadelic recordings. 92 That doesn’t matter, 
because the Funkadelic sound recording copyrights were purchased by Bridgeport 
music, which is pursuing a different business model. 93 
 In the 1990s, copyright lawyers were briefl y seduced by the notion of subjecting all 
consumer uses to individually negotiated licenses managed by intelligent software 
 88  See, e.g., Tom Sydnor,  A “digital-fi rst-sale” doctrine – Do we really need (another) one – or two ?, 
TechPolicyDaily.com, Sept. 11, 2004, at  www.techpolicydaily.com/technology/digital-fi rst-sale-doctri
ne-really-need-another-one-two/ . See also  Jane C.  Ginsburg ,  Fair Use for Free or Permitted-but-Paid ,  29 
 Berkeley Tech. L. J.  1383 ( 2014 ) (suggesting that many of the current non-creative fair uses should 
be subject to a new licensing regime). Ginsburg acknowledges that the diffi culty of setting terms and 
royalties for consumer licenses would be formidable. 
 89  See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (1992), aff’d 37 F.3d 881 (1994). 
 90  See, e.g., Aylin Zafar, What It’s Like When a Label Won’t Release Your Album, Buzzfeed, May 12, 
2013, at  www.buzzfeed.com/azafar/what-happens-when-your-favorite-artist-is-legally-unable-to . 
 91  See, e.g., Janis Ian, the Internet Debacle, Performing Songwriter Magazine, May 2002,  www.janisian 
 .com/reading/internet.php . 
 92  See, e.g.,  www.hiphopdx.com/index/news/id.18253/title.george-clinton-explains-saving-hip-hop-artists- 
 on-samples-recalls-early-days-of-dr-dre-afrika-bambaataa-eminem . 
 93  See Bridgeport Music v. UMG Recordings (6th Cir. 2009); Tim Wu, Jay Z v. The Sample Troll, 
Slate, Nov. 16, 2006, at  www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2006/11/jayz_versus_the_sample_
troll.html . Since Bridgeport demonstrated the economic advantages of operating as a copyright 
troll, a number of other businesses have followed its example of buying up copyrights in order to 
bring multiple lawsuits against alleged infringers. Some of these businesses have sued thousands 
of individuals who are alleged to have unauthorized copies of works. See, e.g., Righthaven 
v. Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp.2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011); AF Holdings, LLC, v. Olivas, 108 
USPQ 2d 1151 (D. Conn. 2013). 
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agents. 94 You remember: “okay, so I can download this track if I pay you 99 cents. 
I also want to convert the fi le format to something my hardware can read, include 
the recording in a compilation I want to put together for my girlfriend, and edit the 
recording so that I can use it as the soundtrack for my fi gure skating routine. May 
I do that for, say, $1.49?” 
 The vision of consumer licenses negotiated by intelligent software agents turned 
out to be a pipe dream. It isn’t that we don’t have the technology to do this. We do. 
Rather, it’s that it makes no economic sense for owners to keep track of a multiplicity 
of individually tailored licenses when they can instead offer only one or two. If we 
say we’re going to rely on voluntary licensing to take care of this sort of use, then, 
we’ve learned that means that it isn’t going to happen. And while that might suit 
some copyright owners just fi ne, it would be bad for the copyright ecosystem, which 
is and should be designed to encourage creative reading as well as creative writing. 
 I said earlier that every author creates works, at least in part, as an act of 
communication. For some authors, that goal of communicating is the only important 
goal. 95 For others, an often more imperative goal is to earn money. Our copyright 
law is not yet well-designed to ensure that creators of works get paid. Indeed, we 
need to face the fact that our copyright system does an embarrassingly lousy job of 
funneling money to creators. That isn’t the readers’ fault; rather the blame belongs 
with the architecture of the system. The United States copyright law has never done 
an admirable job of helping creators to get paid. 96 The law encourages creators to 
convey their copyright interests to publishers, aggregators, and other intermediaries, 
and it does not pay much attention to whether they can take advantage of copyright’s 
benefi ts once they have done so. I’ve written about this elsewhere. 97 But hamstringing 
readers is unlikely to help creators earn more money; it’s merely going to prevent the 
copyright system from doing its job. 
 94  See generally  Julie E.  Cohen ,  Some Refl ections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws 
Designed to Protect Them ,  12  Berkeley Tech. L. J.  161 ( 1997 ) . 
 95  See, e.g., Authors’ Alliance, About Us,  www.authorsalliance.org/about/ (visited August 22, 2014). 
 96  See, e.g.,  Peter  DiCola ,  Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenues and Lessons 
About Copyright’s Incentives ,  55  Ariz. L. Rev. ( 2013 ) ;  Jane C.  Ginsburg ,  The Author’s Place in the 
Future of Copyright ,  153  Proceedings of the Am. Philos. Soc’y  147 ,  148–51 ( 2009 ) , at  www.
amphilsoc.org/sites/default/fi les/proceedings/1530204.pdf ;  Maureen  O’Rourke ,  A Brief History of 
Author-Publisher Relations and the Outlook for the 21st Century ,  50  J. Copyright Soc’y  425 ( 2002 ) . 
Indeed the classes of creators with the strongest copyright control of the exploitation of their works are 
often the classes with the least likely prospect of earning a decent living from their creation of works 
of authorship. Playwrights, for example, have by custom retained almost European control over their 
scripts. Even very successful playwrights, though, earn very little money from licensing productions of 
their plays. T odd London & Ben Pesner, Outrageous Fortune: the Life and Times of the 
New American Play 50–63 (2009). 
 97  Jessica  Litman ,  Real Copyright Reform ,  96  Iowa L. Rev .  1 ,  8 – 12 ( 2010 ) . 
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 In past 25 years, Congress has tweaked the copyright law repeatedly to enhance 
copyright owners’ control over their works. None of those tweaks put more money 
in creators’ pockets. If one of our goals in revising the copyright law is to ensure that 
creators are able to earn more money from their works – and I personally think that 
it should be – then we need to recognize that ratcheting up owner control yet again 
is unlikely to achieve it. Even when copyright revision results in increased copyright 
revenues, copyright owners have displayed a persistent reluctance to share their 
augmented revenues with creators. 98 The lesson of past copyright revisions is that even 
massive enhancement of the scope of copyright owners’ rights and the robustness 
of their remedies doesn’t effect a noticeable increase in author compensation. 99 We 
need to think instead about restructuring the system in ways that make money for 
creators a higher priority than control of copies. When we do that, though, we need 
to make sure that we are also paying attention to the rights of readers, listeners, and 
viewers. Rather than narrowing reader liberties, we should be looking at elements 
of current and past copyright laws that have helped creators to collect a larger share 
of copyright receipts. Statutory and collective licenses that include direct payments 
to authors, 100 termination of transfer and other reversion provisions, 101 a narrowing of 
the work for hire doctrine, 102 and author-favoring construction rules 103 all show some 
promise. Something as simple as requiring the disclosure of accurate information 
about how much of the price of a copy or subscription is actually paid to creators 
may assist the development of norms that support author compensation. 
 The impulse to radically expand the scope of copyright rights and control or 
suppress reader creativity may be motivated by panic about online piracy, but the 
creative engagement of readers, listeners, and viewers isn’t what causes piracy. 
(Indeed, it usually enhances the copyright owners’ bottom line.) More important, 
 98  See, e.g.,  U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace 76–8, 128–30 
(2015). 
 99  Accord Dan Hunter & Nicholas Suzor,  Why Australians Should Back Turnbull in the Stoush over 
Copyright , The Conversation, August 8, 2014, at  http://theconversation.com/why-australians-should- 
 back-turnbull-in-the-stoush-over-copyright-30198 . 
 100  See, e.g., Comments of SAG, AFTRA, & AFM, Copyright Licensing Study, Docket No. 2014–13, 
(May 23, 2014), at  www.copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/comments/Docket2014_3/SAG_
AFTRA_AFM_MLS_2014.pdf . 
 101  See, e.g., Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, And Copyright Term,  supra  note 77 
(testimony of Casey Rae, Future of Music Coalition). 
 102  See, e.g., Jeffrey Trexler,  Taking Back the Kirby Case, The Comics Journal (Aug. 20, 2013), at  www.tcj 
 .com/taking-back-the-kirby-case/ . 
 103  In Cohen v. Paramount, 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988), for example, the Court of Appeals for the 9th 
Circuit adopted a rule of construction limiting an author’s grant to encompass uses contemplated by 
the parties and to reserve to the author all uses the parties did not anticipate. See also Random House 
v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (SDNY 2001), aff’d 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (construing grant 
of right to publish work in book form to exclude ebook publication). 
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though, is that audience members’ engagement greatly enriches the reader’s, 
listener’s, and viewer’s experience of copyrighted works, and is precisely the sort of 
behavior that a copyright system is designed, and should be designed, to promote. 
 What makes this an easy choice is that proposals to further extend copyright 
rights or to subject reading, listening, and viewing to tight control are unlikely to 
discourage people from stealing access to works that they aren’t able to buy. Those 
proposals are much more likely to discourage people from buying access to works 
that they would otherwise be eager to read, hear, or see. 
 But even if the choice were harder – if copyright owners came up with a new 
formulation of their exclusive rights or a new sort of control over their readers that 
seemed certain to produce a measurable reduction in infringement – if the control 
also created a signifi cant burden on reading, listening, and viewing, then adopting 
it would pose a risk of ignoring half of copyright’s purpose:  the half that seeks to 
promote reading. That half is, as I’ve argued, crucially important to the copyright 
system. When we ignore it, the system breaks down. 
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